Research

Publication

Abstract: We review the domestic politics of trade wars with a focus on preferences and institutions. Our review highlights the centrality of domestic distributive conflicts in understanding trade wars. We start by analyzing trade wars from the perspective of voters as consumers. We then turn to firms and employees, emphasizing patterns of fragmentation and cohesion created by modern production technologies: while the immediate effects of product-specific tariffs are limited to relatively few firms and their employees, these effects migrate along domestic supply chains. Using the example of the U.S.-China trade war, we document the geography of the direct and indirect exposure to the trade war across U.S. counties. We also outline implications of our preference map for several categories of institutional theories. Finally, we identify a different question: given the considerable economic costs of trade wars, why do governments fail to reach a settlement before escalating?


Work Under Review

Abstract:As nations forge stronger economic links in globalization, the interchange of ideas and cultural norms naturally follows. How would countries regulate the inflow of foreign information? This study delves into the movie importation pattern among autocratic nations, particularly during election years. I argue that autocratic regimes face a dilemma when intervening in foreign cultural products. On the one hand, autocratic leaders need to minimize the political consequences of foreign movies. On the other hand, autocratic leaders need to avoid public criticism regarding tight information control. Furthermore, this dilemma varied by political conditions. It would be more serious when autocratic countries are politically unstable, such as during election year. Drawing from an original movie release dataset, I demonstrate that autocratic countries reduce the importation of political protest movies during election years due to the downside risks elections pose. Conversely, to maintain an image of media freedom and deflect public criticism, the importation of family romance movies, which generally lack political undertones, remains consistent during election years. 

Keywords: Trade in Cultural Product, Autocratic Regime, Information Control


Abstract: Existing political science research on the impact of globalization has overlooked cultural globalization. To fill this gap, we investigate whether imported political protest movies encourage anti-government demonstrations in autocracies. We argue that protest movies from democratic nations showcase democratic rights and values, demonstrate how to fight for those values, and enhance the social network- protest nexus. Our study uses a unique dataset of political protest movies imported from democracies into autocratic countries between 2000 and 2018. We find that widely-watched protest movies have a significant positive impact, and a battery of placebo tests provides further empirical support. Neither little-watched protest movies nor widely-watched family romance movies affect protests, and widely- watched imported protest movies do not impact prior political protests in autocracies or subsequent political protests in democracies. Our research contributes to the scholarship on the effects of globalization, international service trade, and mass political mobilization, highlighting the role of foreign culture in shaping political outcomes.


Abstract: We study whether trade motivations play an important role in the allocation of bureaucrats across countries, using data on the home cities and post- ings of Chinese ambassadors. We find that the Chinese bureaucracy is more likely to match a country with an ambassador whose hometown imports a significant amount from that host country. Moreover, the effect only exists for “non-partner” countries, where diplomatic work is challenging. Our results are most easily rec- onciled with a network channel: given the strong economic ties between home city and country of posting, an ambassador with such a background would be better positioned to build a strong local network, a particularly valuable feature in non-partner countries.

Keywords: Trade, the allocation of ambassadors, China    


Work in Progress: